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SPITE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
by
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
Spite is not a simple concept. Spiteful actions may be motivated by a
desire to harm others as a source of the actor’s satisfaction. They may also
be a reaction to a personal sense of injustice. Finally, spite-like actions
are consistent with simply righting a wrong. This Article makes the case
that spite, in its worst from, is comparably to theft. It is a taking of
someone’s sense of well-being without consent. It also claims that the
purchase of positional goods is ultimately spite driven. It canvasses tort
law, contracts, tax law, trademark, and criminal law in an effort to
assess the reaction of the law to spite.
I.
II.

Introduction............................................................................... 992
Focusing on Spite ....................................................................... 993
A. What is Spite? ........................................................................... 993
B. “Spite” as Justice Seeking............................................................ 996
C. Spite and Positional Goods....................................................... 1000
D. Spite as Theft .......................................................................... 1002
The Law of Spitefulness.......................................................... 1004
A. Tort Law ................................................................................ 1004
1. Generally ...................................................................... 1004
2. The Cases: Empirical and Qualitative Assessment .............. 1007
B. Arising Out of Contractual Relations ....................................... 1011
C. Facilitation of Positional Goods ................................................ 1018
1. Tax Policy .................................................................... 1019
2. Trademark .................................................................... 1020
D. Criminal Law ......................................................................... 1023
Summary and Conclusions ...................................................... 1025

III.

IV.

*

Huber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar Chair and Professor, University of Florida
College of Law. The author would like to express his appreciation to Sarah Harrison,
Amy Mashburn, and John Stinneford.

991

Harrison_Ready_For_printer_9-4 (Do Not Delete)

992

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

9/11/2018 9:53 AM

[Vol. 22:3

I. INTRODUCTION
You are driving in your car on a four-lane road. Maybe the windows
are down and the radio is up high. You pull into the outside lane to pass
a slower car and just as you are side by side with that car, someone drives
up behind you, way too close. You are annoyed and you ease your foot off
the gas or maybe even tap the brake ever so slightly. The tailgating driver
has to brake to avoid running into you. Why did you do that? Spite is the
most likely answer. Spite is “a . . . desire to harm, annoy, frustrate, or
1
humiliate another person.” The key word here is “desire” as in having a
preference. In effect, the spiteful person enjoys a boost in utility or some
2
other measure of pleasure from having a negative impact on others.
The braking driver is but one example of spiteful behavior. Spite
actually explains a great deal of behavior and law. In varying degrees,
3
4
5
6
7
examples are found in tax, tort, contracts, criminal law, and property.
Arguably even political actions with broad implications can be motivated
8
by spite. This Article is about spite and focuses on how the law reacts to
spite. Section II begins by defining spite more specifically and then
examines the explanation for spiteful behavior. It makes the case that
spiteful actions are a special kind of theft—they involve taking from
others without consent. On the other hand, like the detractors in the

1

WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1840 (1996).
In more economic terms the parties have interdependent utility functions. As
the subject of spiteful behavior had a decrease in utility, the utility of the spiteful
person increases.
3
John Cullis et al., ‘Spite Effects’ in Tax Evasion Experiments, 41 J. SOCIO. ECON.
418, 418 (2012).
4
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 207 (6th ed. 2003).
5
In contract law, duress occurs when there is an improper threat. Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, one example of improper threat is when “the
threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party
making the threat.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (2)(a) (AM. LAW
INST. 1979).
6
One of the standard justifications for punishment in the criminal law context is
retribution. Punishment, however, is expensive, and in the case of retribution, the
benefits to those meting it out is merely psychic.
7
People buy what are referred to as “positional goods” as a way of raising their
status relative to others. Thus, part of the motivation for buying positional or status
goods is the demotion of the rank or status of others. See also Larissa Katz, Spite and
Extortion: A Jurisprudential Principle of Abuse of Property, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1446–47
(2013).
8
At least one theory is that the actions of President Trump are motivated by a
spiteful reaction to President Obama. Paul Krugman, Trump Gratuitously Rejects the
Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/01/opinion/trump-gratuitously-rejects-the-paris-climate-accord.html?_r=0; Bill
Palmer, Donald Trump Damaged Himself Badly Today by Trying to Spite President Obama,
(June 1, 2017), http://www.palmerreport.com/opinion/harmed-trump-obama/3227/.
2
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9

well-known ultimatum game, spiteful-like behavior may be the product
10
of justice-seeking. In this sense, perhaps actions that appear spiteful are
actually not self-regarding but have deontological significance in that the
detractor acts out of sense of duty. Consequently, a distinction is made
between spite as commonly understood and actions that are similar but
based on principle. Section II also explains why the purchase of
11
“positional goods” is ultimately spiteful. Section III is a survey of the law
of spite. The question is whether law takes a consistent view of spite and,
if it does not, if there is some underlying principle that explains the
inconsistency. More specifically, are spiteful people treated like thieves?
This research has a quantitative and a qualitative component. The
conclusion is that criminal and tort law are, to some extent, designed to
decrease spite. Other areas of law are largely neutral, except for
trademark, which actually subsidizes spite. Generally, the law is not
nuanced sufficiently to distinguish self-regarding spite from spitefulness
that may be socially beneficial.
A final note is in order. Much of what is printed in law reviews is
advocacy. The author has a point of view or a position to advance. There
are questions about whether advocacy or “normative scholarship” actually
12
is scholarship. In either case it can be valuable. The analysis that follows
reflects a different sort of effort. It begins with no agenda nor any
preconception of where the research would go. The goal is to achieve an
understanding of these rarely discussed matters and to assess the position
of American law.
II. FOCUSING ON SPITE
A. What is Spite?
Spiteful actions are characterized by two necessary conditions. First,
spite comes at a cost to the spiteful person. It is important to note that
the cost is material and not, on balance, psychic. In fact, the net expected
psychic benefit is positive; otherwise, the spiteful actions, barring
irrationality, would not occur. They do occur as long as the utility derived
9

See infra text accompanying notes 29–32.
See infra text accompanying notes 31–33. Briefly, the game involves two players,
one of whom is the controller. The controller is given a sum of money, which he or
she may keep as long as he or she gets the permission of the other player. This means
the controller can offer the other player none or some portion of the sum. There is
only one try and, if the other player accepts the offer, both parties keep their shares.
If the other player declines, both players leave empty-handed.
11
Positional goods are “those things whose value depends relatively strongly on
how they compare with things owned by others.” Robert Frank, The Demand for
Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 101, 101 (1985).
12
See Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGal
EDUC. 6, 9 (2016).
10
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from the perceived harm to someone else is greater than the disutility of
the spiteful action. For example, in the case of the brake tapper
described at the outset, the action delays the actor’s progress, but the
hope is that the inconvenience is more than offset by the harm to the
tailgater. Thus, it is probably incorrect to view spite as irrational,
although the outcome may appear that way if the spiteful person makes
13
an incorrect judgment. Second, the pleasure or utility derived from
spite is exclusively a function of the expected disutility, pain, or
discomfort of the target of the spiteful conduct. This does not mean that
spite is the only reason for the spiteful person’s actions. For example, in
the conventional case of what are called “spite fences,” the builder of the
fence may actually enjoy the privacy the fence affords without regard for
the impact on others. In addition, there may be satisfaction from
knowing a disliked neighbor will not be able to enjoy the view of forest or
beach. The key is that at least part of the motivation for the action is
based on interdependent utility functions.
14
Spite is distinguishable from other actions that harm others. For
example, in negligence, the harm is typically the result of one party
attempting to save money by not taking preventive measures. The money
saver in the case of negligence would just as soon desire that the harmed
party not be harmed. They derive no independent pleasure from the
harm of another. In contract law, the harm to a non-breaching party is a
direct result of the benefits the breaching party seeks. Again, though, a
contract breaching party causes harm but is not motivated by a desire to
cause harm. The spiteful person’s satisfaction, on the other hand, occurs
because someone is worse off.
These factors also explain the difference between spite and
schadenfreude. They are similar in that they involve deriving pleasure from
the misfortune of others. They differ in an important way that has
implications for the law. For the most part, in the case of schadenfreude,
the pleasure is a windfall. The person finding pleasure in the bad luck or
poor decision making of another may not play any role in bringing the
events about that lead to the unpleasantness.
It also makes sense to distinguish spite from hate and envy. Envy
does not necessarily lead to action designed to harm the subject of that
envy. Envy can result in spiteful actions, but this is most likely to occur
15
when accompanied by a sense of injustice. Much the same is true of
hate. Extreme dislike of someone or something does not mean taking
actions to make the subject of that hate worse off. Hate crimes, on the
13

This would occur if the target of the spiteful action actually did not care.
A variety of definitions are found in David K. Marcus et al., The Psychology of
Spite and the Measurement of Spitefulness, 26 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (2014).
15
Rawls classifies envy as a non-moral feeling that is not to be confused with
resentment, which is a moral feeling in that it is driven by a sense of injustice. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 533 (1971).
14
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other hand, present a special case and are spiteful because they join hate
with actual action. In fact, they might be more accurately labeled as “spite
crimes.” In a sense, spiteful actions can be regarded as mini hate crimes;
they do not reveal hatred for a group or a class of people, but the
willingness to make oneself materially worse off in order to make
someone else worse off represents the same dynamic as in ordinary hate
crimes.
The most difficult distinction is between spite and malice. In fact, the
distinction may be impossible because to some they are synonyms.
16
Nevertheless psychologists, sociologists, and courts seem to have a
separate category for spite. It is true that malicious people derive
pleasure from harming others and this is shared by those who act
spitefully. Spite, though, implies a more direct and perhaps intimate
target. The spiteful person does not derive pleasure from harming just
anyone. Instead, when people act out of spite they are more likely to have
a specific target in mind and that target is someone or some group that
must be “put in their place.” To some extent law gets to this distinction
by distinguishing actual malice and legal malice. Actual malice denotes
17
spite or ill will while legal malice is more in line with reckless disregard.
It is important not to confuse spite with retaliation. For example,
there are many cases dealing with retaliatory discharge. People are
terminated for reasons that seem unfair. Nevertheless, retaliation is often
not to the detriment of those in power. An employer who fires an
employee for taking time off for jury duty may desire to discourage
others from doing the same. In fact, although the employer may lose the
productive worker, the net outcome may be perceived to result in net
material gain. Of course, some terminations do appear to be spiteful or
vindictive. In an important case dealing with a terminable-at-will
18
employee, Monge v. Beebe, a female employee was terminated after
repeatedly declining social advances of her supervisor. There the act of
terminating a productive employee seems motivated by spite rather than
by an effort to affect the behavior of the work force.
Spite as defined here is fundamentally utilitarian and, as noted,
depends on interdependent utility functions. One person hurts another
because it makes the first person feel better off. It is possible, though,
that what appears to be spiteful actions are not utilitarian at all. This idea

16
Courts have held that a showing of legal malice does not require ill-will or
spite. See, e.g., Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Knickel, 793 F.3d 926, 940 (8th Cir. 2015);
Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W.2d 61, 71 (N.D. 1968).
17
Bocek v. JGA Assoc., LLC, No 1:111-cv-0546, 2016 WL 1161401 at *13 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 23, 2016); Molina v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc. No. 07-22644-CIV 2008, WL 4541025
at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2008); Preyer v. Dartmouth Coll., 968 F. Supp. 20, 26 (D. N.H.
1997).
18
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
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19

will be returned to later, but consider the brake tapping driver, the
detractor from the ultimatum game, and punishment in the context of
criminal law. All three can have a utilitarian basis—pleasure is derived
from harm to another. On the other hand, it is possible for the
20
motivation to be more rules-driven or corrective, rather than utility
maximizing, and the party responding gets no satisfaction but feels dutybound to right the wrong. It is impossible to know when actions that
seem spiteful are actually consistent with the self-regarding motivations
or the perhaps a more benign sense of moral obligation.
B. “Spite” as Justice Seeking
Spite has a bad name. The idea of harming others is hard to support
from any perspective. In fact, one author labels spite “altruism’s evil
21
twin.” The idea is that altruism and spite are both motivated by the
desire to increase one’s own utility. Altruism means doing it by perceiving
oneself as having made others better off. Spite accomplishes that greater
sense of well-being by seeming to make others worse off. This may put
spite in an unfair negative light. Spite is often, and maybe most of the
22
time, motivated by a sense of unfairness or injustice. Whether that sense
is legitimate or not is another question.
The implications of a sense of unfairness are illustrated by “equity
theory” which explains why people act differently toward different
23
distributive outcomes. Different distributions will be seen as fair as long
as the following equation holds:
outcomes of person A/inputs of person A = outcomes of person B/inputs of person B

The theory allows for different distributive outcomes to be viewed as
fair as long as those favored or disfavored feel the proportions of
outcomes to inputs are the same. On the other hand, in a typical case,
person B may feel his or her ratio of outcomes to inputs is 1/3 while that
of person A is 1/2. There are a number of ways to return to what is

19

See infra text accompanying notes 33–38.
This is true in the case of retribution as a purpose of punishment. See infra text
accompanying notes 33–38.
21
W.L. Vickery et al., Spite: Altruism’s Evil Twin, 102 OIKOS 413, 413 (2003).
22
For example, tax evasion efforts are more pronounced when there is the
perception that the system is unfair. See Cullis, et al. supra note 3, at 423.
23
Equity theory seems to have originated by J. Stacy Adams. See J. Stacy Adams,
Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267,
268 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965); J. Stacy Adams, Toward an Understanding of
Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 422, 422 (1963); see also Elaine Walster et al.,
New Directions in Equity Research, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1,
1 (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds., 1976); Peter Shabad, Giving the Devil His
Due: Spite and the Struggle for Individual Dignity, 17 PSYCHOANALYTICAL PSYCHOL. 690,
691 (2000).
20
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24

perceived to be an equitable outcome. For example, in an employment
25
situation, B could reduce his or her efforts. Alternatively, B could take
steps to reduce the outcomes of person A. Either one could make the
sides of the equation equal.
Perhaps the best example of spite in operation is found in behavioral
economics and experiments involving the ultimatum game. In this twoparty game a controller is appointed and a sum of money allocated to the
26
parties. The parties cannot communicate. It is an ultimatum game
because the controller (A) gets one opportunity to offer his or her
counterpart (B) a portion of the money. If he or she accepts the offer,
the parties keep the money. If he or she rejects the offer, neither party
keeps any portion of the money. The question is how much A should
offer. Traditionally, economic theory would indicate that if both parties
27
are rational, the controller should offer nothing or a very small share.
28
The idea is that B is better off with even a small share and to reject the
offer would mean being worse off.
Repeated experiments with the game indicate that this is not the
29
usual outcome. For example, suppose the controller is given $10. In
24

See Paul D. Sweeny, Distributive Justice and Pay Satisfaction: A Field Test of an Equity
Theory Prediction, 4 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 329, 335 (1990).
25
See J. Stacy Adams & Sara Freedman, Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and
Annotated Bibliography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43, 47
(Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds., 1976); J. Stacy Adams & William B.
Rosenbaum, The Relationship of Worker Productivity to Cognitive Dissonance About Wage
Inequities, 46 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 161, 161–62 (1962); Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald
E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical Decision-Making: Consequences of Violating
Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 291 (2008); see also Keith
Jensen, Punishment and Spite: The Dark Side of Cooperation, 365 PHILOS. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2635, 2643 (2010).
26
See Shmuel Zamir, Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining, 61 ANNALES
D’ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 1, 2 (2001); Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan,
Unfairnesss, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. HUM. DECIS. PROCESS. 208, 220 (1996); Werner Güth et al.,
An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORGAN. 367, 367
(1982). See generally COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY–EXPERIMENTS IN
STRATEGIC INTERACTION 44 (2003).
27
Güth et al., supra note 26, at 372.
28
Or B is no worse off if B is offered nothing.
29
Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the
Ultimatum Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1755 (2003); see also Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Ultimatum Game, J. ECON. PERSPECT., 195, 197 (1988); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness
and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S285–86 (1986); Daniel Kahneman et
al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
728, 729–30 (1986). A similar theme is found in Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L.
Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J. LAW ECON. 73, 95–96 (1982).
See also Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An
Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 259,
259–60 (1985). See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
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many instances, an offer of $0.10 or $1.00 is rejected. In effect, the small
offer offends B, who would rather take nothing than experience what he
30
or she perceives as an unfair outcome. This is consistent with equity
theory in that the inputs of both participants are the same. Something
other than an equal division is likely to seem unfair to B. B can bring
31
equity back by making sure neither party is enriched. In effect, there is
32
sacrifice to create a sense of fairness. It is also consistent with what we
regard as spiteful behavior. B is willing to be worse off in order to also
make A worse off. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that the
person rejecting the offer has no real desire to make anyone worse off
but is reacting to right the wrong of a stingy offer. This distinction cannot
be determined, but it does suggest that what might be regarded as
spiteful is not as self-regarding as it initially appears.
When one views spite as a reaction to perceived unfairness—whether
33
in the context of the ultimatum game or paying taxes —the concept and
the actions seem more defendable and less objectionable. Does this
mean that every incident of spite is a case of reacting to a perceived
unfairness? In many cases, it is. The driver who slows down as described
at the outset of this Article usually regards the tailgating drivers as an
advantage taker or at least someone who is not observing a norm. Even in
34
instances of litigation or battles over child custody, the likelihood is that
one party is willing to sacrifice as a means of rebalancing the equities as
subjectively perceived. In effect, the party feeling a sense of unfairness—
whether motivated by self-interest or a sense of what is right or wrong—
attempts to make an informal adjustment to reestablish a sense of justice.
Related to the possibility that spite or spite-like action is oftentimes
motivated by informal fairness seeking is the idea, explored primarily by
social scientists, that spite is an important factor in encouraging
35
cooperation. People who act spitefully are punishers, and if that
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1998); Georg Kirchsteiger, The Role of Envy in
Ultimatum Games, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374 (1994); Matthew Rabin,
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284
(1993).
30
One of the important aspects of the ultimatum game was that the outcome
seemed to disprove the economic assumption that people were rational maximizers
of self-interest. On the other hand, whether rejecting an offer is rational or not
depends on how powerful a person’s sense of fairness is.
31
This is not to say there must be an even division for the parties to agree.
32
See generally Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and
Indignation, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 337, 349 (2001). But see Armin Falk et al., Driving
Forces Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETICA 2017, 2028 (2005).
33
See Cullis, et al., supra note 3, at 423.
34
Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 225, 239 (1982).
35
F. W. Marlowe et al., The ‘Spiteful’ Origins of Human Cooperation, 278 PROC.
ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL 2159, 2163 (2011); Jensen, supra note 25, at 2644; Mark

Harrison_Ready_For_printer_9-4 (Do Not Delete)

2018]

9/11/2018 9:53 AM

SPITE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

999

punishment is wielded in particular ways, it can encourage the target to
36
adhere to group norms. In effect, spiteful acts are costly to the actor and
to the subject of spite but may accrue to the benefit of a group over the
37
long run. One group of social scientists puts it broadly: “It is mainly
[spite] that is relevant for understanding the origins of human
38
cooperation.”
This may paint too rosy a picture of spite or its moral-based
equivalent and an incomplete one. First, it is hard to square equityseeking spite with actions that seem purely motivated by cruelty or
hatred. In cases of what might be called “pure spite,” individuals simply
enjoy harming others even though that harm comes at a risk of harm or
39
punishment. Second, it is important to note that a sense of unfairness is
purely subjective and is highly dependent on factors such as self-esteem, a
40
sense of entitlement, and social comparisons. In short, one should not
be too quick to look favorably on the spiteful person because they may
react to perceived unfairness. That sense may be based on an inflated
sense of entitlement. In fact, consider the findings of one study with
41
respect to the personality traits of spitefulness. Spite was found to be
positively correlated with aggression, psychopathy, Machiavellianism,
42
narcissism, and guilt-free shame. On the other hand, spite was
negatively correlated with self-esteem, guilt proneness, agreeableness,
43
and conscientiousness. Third, even if one takes a favorable view of spite
as a means of advancing cooperation, it is important to note that
cooperation in the abstract carries no particular moral connotation. The
purposes of cooperation can range from helping the poor to attempting
to remain undetected while fixing prices.

Hauser et al., Evolving the Ingredients for Reciprocity and Spite, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC.’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 3255, 3263 (2009); Samuael Bowles & Herbert Gintis,
Social Preferences, Homo Economicus, and Zoon Politikon, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CONTEXTUAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS 173 (Robert D. Goodin & Charles Tilly eds., 2006).
36
Jensen, supra note 25, at 2644; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 85 (1984).
37
Jensen, supra note 25, at 2644; Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Social Norms and
Human Cooperation, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 185, 189 (2004).
38
Marlowe et al., supra note 35, at 2163.
39
One example may be rape in which the rapist’s utility is a function of the lack
of consent by the victim.
40
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 445, 456 (1994).
41
Marcus et al., supra note 14, at 1.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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C. Spite and Positional Goods
Spite as analyzed here is probably under inclusive. If spite entails
actions that make others worse off, then it is possible to include the
purchase and possession of what economists call “positional goods” as
spiteful. Positional goods are: “those things whose value depends
44
relatively strongly on how they compare with things owned by others.”
In short, the appeal of these goods is not based on their usefulness but
45
on their ability to signal the superiority of the purchaser. For the most
part, those who write about positional spending are concerned with
46
positional externalities—pressures on others to “keep up.” Economist
Robert Frank, the leading commentator on positional spending,
47
compares the effort to obtain position goods to a military arms race. In
effect, neither country gains an advantage and each neglects spending on
48
goods and services that satisfy other needs. The analogy is valid but does
not sufficiently emphasize the point that in the context of consumer
goods the “winners” actually decrease the status and perceived well-being
of those less affluent. Lifting the status of the purchaser means lowering
the relative status of those who cannot afford the same goods. Jon Elster
captures this idea when he describes unethical preferences: “[T]hese
would include spiteful and sadistic preferences, and arguably also the
desire for positional goods, i.e. goods such that it is logically impossible
49
for more than a few to have them.”
This is not to say all motivations for purchasing luxury goods are
related to their positional quality. They may, in fact, have qualities that
are attractive to the buyer regardless of the impact on others.
Nevertheless, in some instances people protect their relatively higher
status or attempt to establish it by the consumption of goods that are
unavailable to others. The more expensive the good, the more likely this
is to be true. Accordingly, the non-neutral effect of consuming these
goods is noted by Ugo Pagano, who observes that “if an individual i

44

Frank, supra note 11, at 101; see also Fredrik Carlsson et al., Do You Enjoy Having
More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods, 74 ECONOMICA 586, 586 (2007);
Robert Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Positional Externalities?, 92 J. PUB. ECON.
1777, 1778 (2008); FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27–28 (1976).
45
See generally Robert Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable
Welfare Loses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 137, 137 (2005). See also Roger Mason,
Conspicuous Consumption and the Positional Economy: Policy and Prescription Since 1970, 21
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 123, 123 (2000).
46
Xavier Landes, Why Taxing Consumption?, in 40 IUS GENTIUM 101, 103
(Mortimer Sellers & James Maxeiner eds., 2015). See also Thomas D. Griffith,
Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1384 (2004).
47
Frank, supra note 44, at 1777.
48
Id. at 1778.
49
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 22
(1983).
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consumes [quantity X], the second individual must consume an equal
50
but negative quantity . . . .” In effect, these are zero sum goods. Rawls’
view is somewhat similar:
A person who is better off may wish those less fortunate than he to
stay in their place. He is jealous of his superior position and
begrudges them the greater advantages that would put them on a
level with himself. And should this propensity extend to denying
them benefits that he does not need and cannot use himself, then
he is moved by spite.51

While Rawls wrote in terms of denying benefits to others, the fact is
that spite is likely to be mixed with other motives. Being motivated to
consume, at least in part, because others cannot is enough to evidence
spite.
52
In his 1992 article, Relative Preferences, Richard McAdams pulls many
53
of these themes together. He refers to relative and absolute otherregarding preferences. In the case of relative other-regarding
preferences, “one derives pleasure or displeasure from the fact of
another’s consumption level in relation to one’s own, i.e., where the ratio
of one’s consumption to the other’s determines the effect on one’s
54
satisfaction.” A negative relative preference is one in which there “is a
preference for a consumption position that is favorable in comparison to
55
that of others.” Thus, “making someone absolutely better off may itself
make others worse off if the others prefer to maintain a certain economic
56
position relative to the one whose wealth is increased.” In effect, a
person can increase his or her satisfaction by lowering the relative
consumptive position of those of lower rank, raising the consumptive
position of oneself, or both. The goal of these purchases is to increases
the distance between those who are higher ranked from those of lower
rank. According to McAdams, “‘[c]onsumptive position’ may refer to the
quantity or the quality of particular goods, including intangible goods
57
such as prestige, or it may refer to the sum of all goods, i.e., wealth.”
There is no question that position goods present greater complexity
than the more traditional spiteful actions. In a sense they involve a softer
50

Ugo Pagano, Is Power an Economic Good? Notes on Social Scarcity and the Economics
of Positional Goods, in THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF POWER 63, 63 (Samuel Bowles,
et al. eds., 1999); Mason, supra note 45, at 124.
51
RAWLS, supra note 15, at 533.
52
Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1992).
53
For the history of this perspective, see also Nestor M. Davidson, Property and
Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 777–78 (2009).
54
McAdams, supra note 52, at 8. In the case of absolute other regarding
preferences, the pleasure or displeasure is unrelated to one’s own.
55
Id. at 9.
56
Id. at 4–5 (emphasis removed).
57
Id. at 9.
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version of spite. This is because there is unlikely to be any personal
58
animus, and one does not have a sense of directly denying benefits to
others. Nevertheless, the act of consuming these relatively scarce items
makes it less likely that others can share in the benefits, and part of the
reason for their pricing and desirability is the denial of others. Put more
bluntly, like spite more generally, positional goods represent an
investment that is only rationale if others are made relatively worse off.
Imagine this thought experiment. You test drive a car and enjoy its
comfort, style, acceleration, and handling qualities. You like it enough to
buy it. The salesperson then presents you with a choice. For $40,000 you
may buy the car and it will display the Kia identification. Or, for $55,000
you can buy the same car and it will carry the Bentley insignia. Very
importantly, no one will ever suspect the cars are actually the same
except for the labeling. In effect, are you willing to pay $15,000 simply for
the impression the car makes on others and for the exclusiveness it
signals? Perhaps not, but would you pay $1.00? In either case, you are
actually buying the appearance of scarcity and exclusivity, and ultimately,
the only value you derive is the knowledge that others have the
appearance of being worse off. Regardless of what your choice might be
or how much you would pay in this situation, we know that there is an
59
enormous market ranging from watches and handbags, to yachts,
60
houses, and cars for signaling goods.
This may not seem as spiteful as tapping on your brakes when the
tailgating driver gets too close or as turning down an offer in the
ultimatum game even though it makes you and your partner worse off.
Nevertheless, the motivation is the same. To elevate oneself relative to
others means lowering their rank, perhaps even their sense of well-being,
and encouraging the negative utility associated with envy. In short, you
feel better because others may perceive themselves to be lower-ranked,
and hopefully, experience a sense of frustration.
D. Spite as Theft
61

Self-regarding spite has characteristics that are similar to theft. We
do not condone theft for moral as well as economic reasons. First, on
purely ethical grounds one may take a Kantian perspective that one
62
should not use others as means to their ends. This is not to say that Kant
58

Although the case of jealous neighbors may be an exception.
See infra text accompanying notes 172–74.
60
See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 139–40 (1999); Frank, supra note 45, at
139–40.
61
Of course, in the case of theft, the perpetrator believes there will be a material
gain. The spiteful person is not out for material gain.
62
See H.B. ACTON, KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 35–41 (1970) (discussing Kant’s
principle of autonomy); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 114
59
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would rule out spite-like actions based on the view that a wrong must be
addressed. That is different, however, from the self-regarding concept of
spite.
Second, it is hard to square theft with any concept of efficiency. For
example, it cannot be efficient under a Pareto standard, because the
63
victim of the theft is worse off. In addition, it may or may not be
efficient from the standpoint of maximizing utility. Stealing a painting
may increase my welfare, but for it to be efficient theft, I would have to
make sure your utility is decreased by less than mine is increased. This
could be the case. Perhaps I love the painting and you were growing
quite tired of it. The problem is that it requires the thief to make an
interpersonal comparison of utility, which is impossible. Theft might be
efficient from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. Under Kaldor-Hicks, or wealth
maximization, the transfer would be efficient if I valued the painting
64
more than you did even if you were not compensated for the loss. Here
though, without an actually consensual exchange it is impossible to know
who attributes the greater value to the painting.
Now take spite. The same concerns arise. Aside from whatever moral
qualms one may have about making some people worse off simply
because that increases the utility of the spiteful person, the risks of
inefficiency are no less than in the case of theft. Again, from the Paretian
standpoint, at least one party is worse off. A utilitarian analysis is more
complicated and even riskier than in the context of theft. In general,
spite involves making oneself worse off in order to make the victim worse
off. There is no net payoff unless the victim is perceived to be more worse
off than the spiteful person. This could be the case but opens up a
number of possibilities for error all stemming from the difficulty of a
comparison. To illustrate, go back to the example of the brake tapper.
Two types of errors may occur. The first is the inefficiency error. For
example, you may touch your brakes lightly to annoy a tailgating driver

(James Ellington trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1964) (1797) (respect for others’
autonomy is a duty of virtue); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32 (1974)
(using an individual for the greater social good fails to show sufficient respect for the
individual); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1334 (1986).
63
A Pareto superior outcome is achieved when a transfer leaves at least one party
better off and no one worse off. See THOMAS COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 45–46 (3d ed. 2013). In the case of spite, quite possibly both are worse off
at least materially. In the case of positional goods, the cost of spite is the premium
paid for the signaling quality of the good.
64
Id. at 51–52. In many respects, the concept of efficient spite is like efficient
breach in the context of contracts. It is possible for the breaching party to be more
better off than the non- breaching party is worse off. The problem is that it is
impossible to tell. Even if there is full compensation, there is no guarantee that the
non-breaching party is in as good a position, subjectively, as he or she would have
been in the absence of a breach. Id. at 304–305.
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only to see him or her speed off around you without a care in the world.
65
The second error is a misperception error. You touch your brakes but
do not realize the tailgater was in no hurry and actually did not even
notice. In the spirit of “I’ll show him a thing or two,” you showed him
nothing. When it comes to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the same dangers
arise. Just as it is impossible to know the impact on utility, it is impossible
66
to know what it would take to compensate the victim.
This suggests that spiteful actions require the same type of legal
responses that are employed to deter theft. There are important
differences that in the minds of many may make spite even more
troublesome. The thief is generally indifferent to who is harmed. There
may be no personal animus involved at all. Spite, though, is generally
personal. People are targeted because of who they are. Second, at least in
some instances, spite-like behavior can result from purely moral
considerations. This is less likely to be the case in instances of theft but
raises the issue of whether spite-like behavior should, in some instances,
be tolerated.
III. THE LAW OF SPITEFULNESS
A. Tort Law
1. Generally
67
As noted earlier, negligence is unlikely to be associated with spiteful
actions. The negligent party is guilty of indifference or a calculated effort
to save money. The notion of investing to harm others simply because the
harm produces a positive response in the actor seems strained in those
instances. On the other hand, intentional harms may very well be
spiteful. It can range from the well-known “spite fences,” to practical
jokes that are “beneficial” to one party because of the humiliation of
another, as well as assaults and defamation. If spite is akin to theft, and
the position taken here is that it is, the response should logically be the
same as it is in cases of theft. In tort law this would mean awarding
68
punitive damages.

65

There is an additional possible complication here. The victim of spite suffers,
and the spiteful person’s pleasure must exceed that suffering. Suppose, however, that
the victim’s harm is itself dependent on the amount of pleasure derived by the
spiteful actor. If true, even the hypothetical possibility of efficient spite seems to fade.
66
See POSNER, supra note 4, at 205.
67
See supra text accompanying note 14.
68
Richard Posner makes a case for punitive damages in these cases as a way of
motivating victims to bring private actions, and thus, to relieve the pressure on
criminal law. POSNER, supra note 4, at 207. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 909–10 (1998).
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There is, however, an important distinction between theft and spite
that may have implications for this response. In the case of theft, aside
from important moral considerations described above, the idea is to
channel the transfer of wealth into the market. Thus, if I want your car
and am inclined to simply take it, the threat of punitive damages means it
would be less expensive for me to seek your permission by reaching an
agreement on the compensation due. In the case of spite, there is
unlikely to be compensation. In the case of spite, an actual transaction
seems unlikely. After all, the pleasure of the spiteful person is derived
from the displeasure of victim. The idea of channeling the transaction
into the market makes little sense. If the victim consents, it eliminates the
pleasure for the person acting out of spite.
Take the example of a spite fence. Landowner A is angry at his
neighbor, B, because B’s son operates a loud but legal motorcycle. A has
approached B and even offered to pay to have the noise reduced. He was
told to mind his own business and to “get a life!” A constructs an eightfoot fence between their properties that blocks B’s view of some distant
mountains. In the case of theft, by virtue of punitive damages or criminal
penalties, we would prefer to channel the transaction into the market,
and B would sell his right to his view for a price. B would demand a price
that means he is at least indifferent between the view and the sum paid.
Of course, that would not happen because A’s entire purpose is to make
B worse off. Alternatively, B may file a lawsuit. If he prevails, the court, in
effect, sets the price. The price might be higher, lower, or equal to that
demanded by B in a voluntary transaction. In no case do we know if
efficiency in any form is served, and clearly, the spiteful person uses
others without their consent to achieve his or her ends. In fact, lack of
consent is the source of the pleasure.
Given that efficient spite is but a possibility and that there can be
enormous costs to the spiteful person, it is arguably most efficient to
discourage spite or decrease its consequences. This can be done in two
ways. First, if possible, the gains to the spiteful actor could be disgorged.
This is impossible to measure in monetary terms. Plus, it cannot be a
69
successful determent unless it is effective 100% of time. Nevertheless, in
70
the cases of removal of spite fences and the retraction of defamatory
statements, for example, this can be comparable to undoing the harm.
Otherwise, penalties are appropriate.
And, as it turns out, whether on moral, efficiency, or some other
71
basis, tort law does signal general societal disapproval of spiteful actions.
69

Unless the probability of success by victims is 100%, there may still be positive
expected gains from spiteful actions.
70
See, e.g., Geiger v. Carey, 154 A.3d 1093, 1101 (Conn. App. 2017); Austin v.
Bald II, L.L.C., 658 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. App. 2008).
71
See, e.g., Soderbeck V. Burnett Cty, Wis. 752 F.2d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1985);
Lewis v. Bellows Falls Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 248 F. Supp. 3d 530, 543
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Whether it follows through on this “signal” or is sensitive to equity
seeking or even the occasional benefits of non-self-regarding spiteful
behavior is another matter. To illustrate this distinction, consider three
72
cases. In a North Carolina case, Austin v. Bald II, plaintiff owned a home
next to an apartment development. The apartment property was
surrounded by a six-foot-high fence except for the portion that ran along
plaintiff’s property. That part of the fence was ten feet tall and blocked
the view of a nearby lake and the breezes that came off the lake. There
was testimony that when asked why the fence was ten feet tall, an
73
employee of the defendant remarked, “we are going to show her.” The
court reversed the trial court decision not to permit the jury to consider
punitive damages.
Other cases suggest a different approach to the spiteful actor who is
74
75
equity seeking. But this is not always the case. In Humphrey v. Manbach,
the appellants appealed from a decision that they had erected a spite
fence. Although the appellate court reversed on other grounds, it noted
that before the fence was erected “appellees’ children had been
trespassing upon appellants’ lot and destroying flowers and shrubbery
thereon; that after they protested to appellees, the latter refused to take
steps to prevent further trespasses . . . ; that appellees’ children would
come upon appellants’ property immodestly attired and commit acts of
76
indecency directed toward appellants . . . .”
Although not exactly on point and politically objectionable in many
respects, another case also illustrates some leeway for the spiteful person
who perceives him or herself as protesting an injustice. Johnson v.
77
Johnson dealt with punitive damages in the context of a spouse calling

(D. Vt. 2017); Estate of Jackson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 676 F. Supp. 1142, 1149
(S.D. Ala. 1987); Lee v. Crump, 40 So. 609, 610 (Ala. 1906); Fousel v. Ted Walker
Mobile Homes, Inc., 602 P.2d 507, 511 (Ariz. 1979); Geiger, 154 A.3d at 1113–14;
Austin, 658 S.E.2d at 3; Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969);
Watkins v. Simonds, 354 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1960). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, 1
DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 455 (2d ed. 1993); W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 9–10 (5th ed. 1984). This is not to say that spite is necessary for the
award of punitive damages. See Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1153 (8th Cir.
1984); Tierco Md. Inc. v. Williams, 849 A.2d 504, 526 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); Burnett v.
Thrifty Imports, 773 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Miss. Ct. App. 1989); Prime Co. v. Wilkinson &
Snowden, Inc., No. W2003-00696-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 2218574 at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 2004).
72
Austin, 658 S.E.2d at 3.
73
Id. It appears that the plaintiff was on a city commission that played a role in
denying the expansion of the complex although the plaintiff had no part in that
decision. Id. at 5.
74
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
75
Humphrey v. Mansbach, 64 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1933).
76
Id.
77
Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212, 1212 (R.I. 1995).
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his ex-wife a “whore” in a public place. Evidently, after their marriage the
wife had numerous sexual affairs with men including the husband’s
78
cousin who she also later married and divorced. There were in fact, a
79
string of divorces, affairs, and pregnancies. Eventually, the former wife
returned to the original husband (the defendant) and claimed they had
a common law marriage from which she wanted a divorce and a property
80
settlement. Although the court claimed otherwise, the case is likely
81
indicative of gender bias. The rationale for not permitting punitive
damages reflects a willingness to tolerate some level of informal equity
seeking: “We are then confronted with the question concerning whether
a truthful statement, but one issued with a supportable finding of spite or
ill will under enormous provocation may meet the rigorous standard we
82
set for punitive damages. We believe that it does not.”
2. The Cases: Empirical and Qualitative Assessment
Aside from the examples above, there is little additional evidence
that courts acknowledge that spiteful actors may be justice seekers. What
is clear from a broader perspective is that tort law takes a dim view of
those who act out of spite. This can be inferred from a quantitative or
empirical perspective and a qualitative one. A general examination of
tort law in this regard found the words “spite” and “punitive damages” in
the same paragraph without the term “in spite of” in nearly 1,100
83
opinions. In addition, the terms “actual malice”—a common substitute
for “spite”—and “punitive damages” were in the same paragraph without
84
the term “in spite of” in 4,700 opinions. Finally, 306 opinions used the
terms “actual malice,” “spite,” and “punitive damages” in the same
85
paragraph, again excluding cases that used the term “in spite of.” As a
general matter, when the terms “spite” and “actual malice” were found in
the same paragraph, a court was defining actual malice. For example, as
one Texas case put it: “Texas permits recovery of punitive damages for

78

Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1214.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1217.
82
Id.
83
Westlaw Search for Cases Including “Spite” and “Punitive Damages,” WESTLAW,
https://goo.gl/AoMvWK (search using the following: spite! /p “punitive damages” %
“in spite of”). “In spite of” was eliminated because the phrase is commonly used in
cases that would be irrelevant for the research at hand.
84
Westlaw Search for Cases Including “Actual Malice” and “Punitive Damages,”
WESTLAW, https://goo.gl/FjKGoN (search using the following: “actual malice” /p
“punitive damages” % “in spite of”).
85
Westlaw Search for Cases Including “Actual Malice,” “Spite,” and “Punitive
Damages”, WESTLAW, https://goo.gl/626B2S (search using the following: “actual
malice” /p spite! /p “punitive damages” % “in spite of”).
79
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wrongful discharge upon a showing of actual malice, defined as ‘ill will,
86
spite, evil motive, or specific intent to cause injury to the employee.’”
Clearly, “spite” or its substitute “actual malice” plays a key role in the
award of punitive damages. Because the search involving “punitive
damages” and “spite” or its substitute, “actual malice” yielded an unwieldy
number of possible “observations,” three narrower and specific areas
were more closely examined. These were cases of abuse of process and
87
malicious prosecution. In addition, although not a tort, it was felt that
cases involving possible Rule 11 sanctions, which have a tort-like
88
character, would also be informative. These areas were selected because
they seem particularly likely to involve actions in which a party would act
simply to make an opponent worse off.
According to Prosser, abuse of process is designed to provide a
remedy “for a group of cases in which legal procedure has been set in
motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with ultimate
success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior
89
purpose for which it was not designed.” The key is that the process is
used to produce a result for which the process was not designed. A
Westlaw search found 388 cases in which the terms “spite” and “abuse of
process” were found in the same paragraph. In 717 instances, the terms
“abuse of process” and “actual malice” were found in the same
paragraph. Courts are very clear that the defendant in these cases may be
motivated by spite or ill will but as long as the goal sought is the one the
90
process was designed for, there will be no liability. Consequently, “abuse
of process” cases did not reveal a policy to punish spite. And, although

86

Richey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 670 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 (S.D. Texas, 2009); see,
e.g., Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 283 A.2d 392, 398 (Md. Ct. App. 1971); Burnett v.
Thrifty Imports, 773 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Miss. Ct. App. 1989); Bennett v. 3M Co., No.
3:14-CV-198, 2014 WL 1493188 at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2014).
87
Tortious interference of contract was also examined. See infra text
accompanying notes 132–35.
88
See infra text accompanying notes 101–08.
89
KEETON, supra note 71, at 897.
90
See, e.g., Scott v. D.C., 101 F.3d 748, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Jensen v. Barlas, 438
F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Grabinski v. Natl’ Union Fire Ins. Co., No.
CV041751PHXMHM, 2005 WL 2412784 at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2005); Shoney’s, Inc.
v. Barnett, 773 So. 2d 1015, 1025–26 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Bothmann v. Harrington,
458 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Bourbon Cty. Joint Planning Com’n
v. Simpson, 799 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990). But see Pundzak, Inc. v. Cook, 500
N.W.2d 424, 429–30 (Iowa 1993). Although spiteful intent is not required to establish
abuse of process, spite can enter into the decision about punitive damages for the
defendant who is found guilty of an abuse of process. See Nitcher v. Does, 956 F.2d
796, 800–01 (8th Cir. 1992). As noted above, though, a great number of these cases
noted that even spiteful actors may not be guilty of abuse of process. See generally 3
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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courts are tolerant of spite, it was hardly because the spiteful people, like
the ultimatum game participants, were justice seekers.
More instructive was a survey of cases involving malicious
prosecution. In 1,872 cases, the terms “actual malice” and “malicious
prosecution” were found in the same paragraph. In 451 cases, the terms
“spite” and “malicious prosecution” were found in the same paragraph.
In 142 cases, all three terms were found in the same paragraph. The
elements of malicious prosecution are: the institution of a proceeding,
termination of that proceeding in favor of the accused, absence of
91
probable cause, and malicious motivation. These cases provide a closer
look at the role of spite since the accused must be cleared of any
92
wrongdoing, which raises the likelihood that the prosecutor was simply
interested in the harmful effects on the defendant. It should be noted
that spite or actual malice is not always required for malicious
prosecution. They appear to be sufficient but not necessary for a finding of
liability. Instead, legal malice, as opposed to actual malice, often will be
93
inferred from an absence of probable cause.
What this means is that the range of cases goes from ones in which
there was obvious ill will toward specific individuals to those in which
94
there seems to be no more than indifference to the welfare of others. A
typical example of a case in which spite appeared critical was Grundstein
95
v. Levin, which involved a group of siblings that had inherited a parcel
of land. The land was partitioned but one of the siblings refused to leave
when the others had found buyers for their shares. Eventually that sibling
left but sued the others for conversion of the personal property he left
96
behind. The others countersued for abuse of process and malicious
97
prosecution. The court found no abuse of process but found that there
was malicious prosecution. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed and
wrote:
The [lower] court found that plaintiff’s multiple post-partition
motions and appeals were baseless; that there was no objectively
reasonable basis to believe that they were meritorious; that they
were brought by plaintiff “in bad faith and with ill will and actual
malice” and “solely out of spite and for the purpose of thwarting his
siblings and preventing them from exercising their rights duly
91

KEETON, supra note 71, at 871.
Prosecutor is used here generally to mean the person giving rise to the action,
whether criminal or civil.
93
See Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571–72 (2d Cir. 1996); Lee v.
Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69–70 (3d Cir. 1988); Pallares v. Seinar, 756 S.E.2d 128, 131
(S.C. 2014).
94
This search excluded incidents of the use of the term “in spite of.”
95
Grundstein v. Levin, No. 16-242, 2017 WL 571272, at *1 (Vt. Feb. 1, 2017).
96
Id.
97
Id.
92
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granted them by the partition judgment”; and that defendants
prevailed in all of them.98

In the context of malicious prosecution, courts seem to be in line
with the idea that spite can be analogized to theft in that a finding of
99
actual malice is followed by awarding punitive damages.
Although not a tort, Rule 11 sanctions have a tort-like quality. In fact,
100
over 20 years ago, it was noted that Rule 11 plays a role similar to the
101
rules against spite fences. The question here is to what extent courts
take spiteful motives into account when sanctioning an attorney for Rule
11 violations. Again, it is difficult to separate cases involving spite as
defined here from efforts meant to harass with some hope for more than
psychic gain. Nevertheless, spite is often mentioned as the basis for Rule
102
103
11 sanctions. A good example is Fox v. Boucher, a Second Circuit

98

Id. at *2.
See Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 166 (4th Cir. 1989); Hampton v. Mathis,
No. 87-2653, No. 87-2654, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 20542, at *11–12 (4th Cir. Sept. 1,
1988); Chavez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 525 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1975); Scott v.
Bender, 948 F. Supp. 2d 859, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Tierco Md. Inc. v. Williams, 849
A.2d 504, 526 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); Sanders v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 814
(Mo. 1984); Abbitt v. Bartlett, 112 S.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.C. 1960); Columbus
Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ohio 1975); Davis v. Tunison, 155
N.E.2d 904, 906–07 (Ohio 1959); Lee v. Southland Corp., 244 S.E.2d 756, 759 (Va.
1978); Gaut v. Pyles, 181 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Va. 1971). For the necessity of actual malice
in the context of tortious interference, see Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d
203, 210 (Tex. 1996).
100
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the
court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.”).
101
Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 67
(1995). See also Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685
(2011).
102
See, e.g., Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37–38 (2nd Cir. 1986); Cavallary v.
Lakewood Sky Diving Ctr., 623 F. Supp. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Florida Bar v.
Pascoe, 526 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1988); Tilman v. Brink, 911 N.E.2d 764, 770 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2009); Taupa Lithuanian Fed. Credit Union v. Bajercius, 1997 Mass. App.
Div. LEXIS 15, at *9 (Mass. App. Div. Mar. 11, 1997). See also Mortell v. Mortell Co.,
887 F.2d 1322, 1328 (7th Cir. 1989).
103
Fox, 794 F.2d at 37–38.
99
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opinion in which the plaintiff, an attorney, leased a home to the Hogges.
When Mr. Hogge died suddenly, Mrs. Hogge moved out and, by
telephone, requested a return of her security deposit. Fox refused noting
that she probably did not need the money since she likely collected
insurance. Hogge became upset and handed the phone to her father
(Boucher) and an argument ensued in which Boucher may have referred
104
to Fox as a “rich lawyer.” Eventually, Hogge sued and recovered the
security deposit, and in the aftermath, was told by Fox that “I’m going to
105
get you for this.” Fox then sued Boucher on a theory of prima facie tort
and requested punitive damages. The lower court sanctioned Fox and
was upheld by the Second Circuit, which reasoned that, “[c]ourts look
106
with disfavor on this sort of unfounded spite action.”
This examination finds that spite plays a key role in awarding
punitive damages, in finding malicious prosecution, and in Rule 11
sanctions. Although the same tendency was not found in the case of
abuse of process, it can safely be said that tort law is designed to
discourage spiteful actions. On the other hand, there was no evidence
that tort law created a safe harbor for justice seekers or those acting for
107
non-self-regarding reasons.
B. Arising Out of Contractual Relations
The search for judicial reactions to spite was extended to contract
law. One initial possibility concerned duress and Restatement (Second)
108
of Contracts, section 176(2)(a) which includes this definition of an
improper threat: “the threatened act would harm the recipient and
109
would not significantly benefit the party making the threat, . . . .”
Examples include a threat to reveal harmful information about a party
110
unless he or she will enter into a contract. Although there is a clear
spite-like flavor to these types of threats, there is ultimately a payoff for
the threatening party that extends beyond the satisfaction of simply
harming another.
As in conventional tort remedies, the more fertile areas for reacting
to spite would be in the area of damages. In the context of a contract
breach, punitive damages are generally not permitted even if the breach

104

Id. at 38. This was denied by Boucher.
Id. at 36.
106
Id. at 38.
107
One qualifying comment is in order. The definition of spite in the context of
tort law is broader than the one employed in this Article. This follows from the
notion that spite is often equated with actual malice, which, itself can, but not always,
be inferred from the harshness of one’s action.
108
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
109
Id.
110
Id. at Illustration 12.
105
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were designed simply to injure another and create predominately psychic
gains for the breaching party. Probably the best-known example of this
111
resistance is White v. Benkowski. The Whites purchased a house without
an independent water supply but contracted for the supply of water from
their neighbors, the Benkowskis. Evidently the parties had a friendly
relationship that turned sour at which time the Benkowskis began to shut
112
the supply of water off intermittently.
The jury found that the
113
Benkowskis had acted maliciously and simply to harass but disallowed
114
an award of punitive damages.
In general, even if there were spiteful breaches like that in White v.
Benkowski, under the expectancy measure of damages, the non-breaching
party is compensated for whatever monetary harm is suffered. This, of
course, is the notion of an efficient breach, a theory that has been
115
roundly criticized. Nevertheless, whether the efficient breach is a
mirage or not, contract theory seems to go out of its way to avoid
penalizing those who breach. Indeed, under conventional law with
respect to liquidated damages, the parties may not even stipulate to
116
damages that would constitute a penalty.
In the case of the efficient breach, the breaching party is seen to
gain, in a monetary sense by virtue of the breach. This has generated
117
some calls for disgorgement of these gains. This is related to a
theoretical reaction to spite. The spiteful contract breaching party is
rewarded in part by the psychic gain from making his or her contractual
counterpart worse off. Although impossible to measure, the need to
cancel these psychic gains amounts to an argument for routine punitive
damages when breaches are spiteful. Nevertheless, there appear to be no
reported cases in which a plaintiff has recovered on the basis of the
psychic pleasure experienced by the breaching party as a result of
harming another.

111

White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Wis. 1967).
Unlike the typical efficient breach scenario, there was no sign that the water
was to be sold to a higher bidder.
113
White, 155 N.W.2d at 78.
114
Id. at 77–78.
115
See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 167, 176 (2013); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—
Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (1981).
116
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
117
Kelsey A. Hayward, Comment, Disgorgement of Defendant’s Gains from
“Opportunistic” Breach of Contract: Its Fit in Rhode Island, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
614, 616 (2017); John D. McCamus, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative
Perspective, 36 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 943, 943 (2003); Caprice L. Roberts, A
Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 945, 948 (2008).
112
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Four thin possibilities exist for courts to react to spite in the context
of contracts. First, not every court has followed the teachings of White v.
Benkowski; there appear to be isolated instances in which courts do allow
the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract unrelated to a
tort claim. A word of caution is warranted here: The fact that punitive
damages may be permitted does not mean they are rewarded consistently
or at all for spiteful breaches. Second, there are instances in which what
would be a contract breach is successfully pled as a tort claim. Here
again, the connection to spiteful or malicious action is tenuous. Third,
and more promising, are cases based on tortious interference. Finally,
there are isolated cases that allow for recovery of mental suffering as a
result of contract breach. These damages seem susceptible to having a
punitive element, and thus, may reflect a policy opposed to spite.
The examination of the first possibility begins with a 1999 article by
William Dodge representing a painstaking study of the availability of
118
punitive damages in breach of contract cases. As of 1998, Dodge found
119
that eight states allowed or appeared to allow punitive damages. He
concluded, however, that the trend was toward lessening the availability
120
of punitive damages in contracts cases. The difficulty of pinning down
the actual position of each state is exemplified by Tennessee in which
courts have stated that there are exceptions to the no punitive damages
121
rule in cases of “fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression.” On the
other hand, Tennessee courts have also written, “[t]he rare case where
punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract under
Tennessee law occur when the breach of contract ‘is coupled with a tort
122
involving, fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression.’” Similarly,
Hawaii, which seems to allow punitive damages for breach of contract

118

William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629,
633–34 (1999). See also Mark Pennington, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A Core
Sample from the Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L. REV. 31, 31 (1989).
119
Dodge, supra note 118, at 647–48 (Four more states allowed punitive damages
if there existed a special relationship between the parties. The 8 states seeming to
allow punitive damages were Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont.).
120
Id. at 635.
121
Medley v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 912 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
See also, Bennett v. CMH Homes, Inc., Nos. 15-5541/5577, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS
16930, at *18 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2016); Mohr v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. W200601382-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619, at *40–41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14,
2008).
122
Boyd v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., Case 2:11-cv-02616-STA-cgc, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 183690, at *26–27 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2012) (quoting Smith v.
Nationwide Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added)).

Harrison_Ready_For_printer_9-4 (Do Not Delete)

1014

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

9/11/2018 9:53 AM

[Vol. 22:3

puts it this way: “[B]reach of contract in Hawaii must result in ‘tortious
123
injury’ to justify an award of punitive damages.”
When courts do award punitive damages in contracts cases, the facts
typically resemble those that would support a claim in tort. For example,
124
in VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, a Utah case, the
breach of contract—a settlement—claim was closely related to abuse of
process. Evidently, the breach was in the form of a lawsuit filed after a
dispute about a debt had been settled. The lower court instructed the
jury that punitive damages under contract were available if the breach
125
was “intentional and accompanied by malice.” On the other hand, in a
decision by the Utah Supreme Court, the court noted that “we and other
jurisdictions have allowed punitive damages where the breach of contract
126
amounts to an independent tort.”
Given the paucity of cases in which punitive damages are awarded in
contracts it made sense to explore contract breaches that were pled as
tort claims. More specifically, to what extent is spite a factor in those
127
cases that cross over the so-called borderline between contract and
tort? It would be a simple matter if the crucial variable were spite. It is not
that simple. Although difficult to support with actual case analysis, the
standard that makes the most sense in this context is that contract crosses
over to tort, and therefore, the possibility of punitive damages when the
“harm is deliberately caused and the satisfaction obtained by the actor is
128
‘illicit.’” Illicit is, however, broader than the psychic rewards of simply
making another party worse off. For example, an insured may be
awarded punitive damages when an insurer persistently refuses to pay a
claim that is due. In fact, at least one court found that this behavior was
evidence that the insurer “acted maliciously, with an intent to oppress,
129
and in conscious disregard of the rights of its insured.” In these types of
cases, often dealing with the absence of fair dealing or good faith, the
target selected is based on the monetary benefit to be gained by the
breaching party. The element of personal animus necessary to be labeled
“spiteful” is not present.

123

Cuson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 735 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Haw. 1990). See also
TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 199 P.3d 929, 933 (Utah 2008).
124
VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 963 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
125
Id. at 964.
126
Jorgensen v. John Clay & Company, 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983).
127
See Leslie E. John, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the
Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2034 (1986).
128
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 77 (1982).
129
Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986–87 (Cal. 1978). See generally
John, supra note 127.
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Frank Cavico captures the tort/contract distinction when he suggests
that tortious breach should include cases in which the defendant’s
130
conduct “maliciously or oppressively caused harm to the plaintiff.” It
131
requires something more than an “economic decision not to perform.”
Moreover, punitive damages would apply when there is an intentional
breach “with the intent of causing the victim harm beyond the harm usually
132
considered as reasonably foreseeable for breach of contract.” Cavico
distinguishes the type of behavior leading to punitive damages from bad
133
faith in which the primary goal is not to harm the victim. Nevertheless,
many tortious breach cases fall under the general label of “bad faith” and
the effort here was to probe these cases to see the extent to which they
seemed to address spite in its purest form.
To assess whether spite was a factor in awarding punitive damages in
tortious breach cases, a sample of 271 cases using the search terms set out
134
in the footnote was selected. Well over half of the sample involved cases
in which insurers refused to pay or defend insureds and were, therefore,
135
alleged to have acted in bad faith. Regardless of how one feels about
the practice of insurance companies of delaying or refusing to pay, these
are not true spite cases. Although no cases were found that involved spite
as cleanly as that in Benkowski, it is clear that a number of jurisdictions
have broad enough parameters for what would constitute a tortious
breach deserving of punitive damages to accommodate spiteful
136
behavior.
One Maryland court is particularly on point in this regard.
Accordingly, “[w]hen a tort is alleged to arise out of a contractual
relationship, actual malice is the essential prerequisite to the recovery of
137
punitive damages.” Actual malice means the purpose is “to deliberately
138
and willfully injure the plaintiff.” Similarly a Mississippi court notes that
130
Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A Principled Approach,
22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 357, 445 (1990).
131
Id. at 448.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 447.
134
To identify these cases the following search was conducted using Westlaw:
“tortious breach” /p “punitive damages and any of the following terms: spite, malice,
oppression, “actual malice.”
135
In addition, “tortious breach” did not always refer to breach of contract.
136
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wells Fargo Bank, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01303-KJM-CMK,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119327, at *28–29 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 2, 2016); Quality Auto. Co. v.
Signet Bank/Md., 775 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D. Md. 1991); L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v.
Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 282–283 (Ark. 1984) (dissent); Cohen v. Sterling, No.
B247899, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 1952, at *33 (Ct. App. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015); Willard v.
Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So.2d 539, 543 (Miss. 1996).
137
Quality Auto. Co., 775 F. Supp. at 853.
138
Id. (quoting Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 283 A.2d 392 (Ct. App. Md.
1971)).
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“punitive damages [based on tortious breach of contract] are recoverable
for breach of contract when such breach is attended by intentional
139
wrong, insult, abuse or . . . gross negligence.” Despite this language, a
close look at the cases did not reveal any instances in which the courts
identified spite, as defined here, as the basis for punitive damages when
liability was based on tortious breach of contract. There is an element of
consistency here. In a sense, those who breach contracts are strictly
liable. Except in the narrow group of instances in which performance is
excused due to unforeseen circumstances, damages are paid. Courts do
not tend to assess the motivation for a breach, and in so doing, also treat
140
most breaching parties alike.
A pattern of finding punitive damages appropriate in cases of spite
(or actual malice) is present in tortious interference cases. The cases
here, though, are a bit muddled. In some instances, spite or actual malice
141
is required to establish a case of tortious interference. In other
instances, spite or actual malice is critical only in the award of punitive
142
damages. But even with respect to punitive damages, courts are not
consistent in what is required. For example, in Banks v. Mario Industries of
Virginia, Inc., sales agents for an 80-year-old firm set up a new firm as a
143
competitor. They did this while still employed by the plaintiff firm and
made use of confidential records of that firm. The lower court awarded
punitive damages and the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the decision.
The defendants argued there was no showing of “malice, willfulness, or
144
wantonness[,]” and thus, punitive damages were unwarranted. The

139

Willard, 681 So.2d at 543.
The entire inquiry into the possibility of cases arising from contracts also
resulting in punitive damages is difficult because of the dual use of spite. Specifically,
if spite-like actions result in crossing the borderline from contract to tort, can they
also be used to assess punitive damages? It seems like they must be, but the dearth of
cases that mention spite in the context of tortious interference makes this assessment
impossible.
141
KEETON, supra note 71, at 984. See, e.g., Mountain States Pipe & Supply Co. v.
City of New Roads, La., No. 12-2146, 2013 WL 3199724, at *3 (E.D. La. 2013);
Powderly v. MetraByte Corp., 866 F. Supp. 39, 43 (D. Mass. 1994); Skaskiw v. Vermont
Agency of Agric., 112 A.3d 1277, 1288 (Vt. 2014).
142
See, e.g., Lawyers Title Co. v. Kingdom Title Sol.’s, Inc., 592 F. App’x 345, 353
(6th Cir. 2014); Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir.
2001); Bullet Express, Inc. v. New Way Logistics, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 251, 266 (Ill. App. Ct.
2016); Alexander & Alexander v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc., 650 A.2d 260, 269
(Md. 1994). In Zimmerman, the court assessed the level of maliciousness under the
steps provided by the Supreme Court in BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575
(1996). (In particular the Gore Court noted that a critical factor was the degree of
reprehensibility of the conduct.).
143
650 S.E.2d 687 (Va. 2007).
144
Id. at 700.
140
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Court rejected the argument evidently equating the purpose of
145
competing and the resulting injury to the plaintiffs as malicious.
146
This can be compared with a Texas case, in Clements v. Withers,
which arguably has a higher standard for punitive damages.
Actual malice need not be shown to recover compensatory damages
for the tort of interference with an existing contractual
relationship. Intentional and knowing interference must be shown,
but there may be liability even though the interferor’s motive be to
save money for himself or another. On the other hand, to support
the recovery of punitive damages in such a case, there must be a
finding of actual malice: ill-will, spite, evil motive, or purposing the
injuring of another.147

Aside from torts arising out of contractual relations, there is one
remaining possible avenue for courts to respond to spite—by allowing
recovery for mental suffering when there is a breach of contract. In some
sense there seems to be a logical connection here. After all, spiteful
behavior is actually designed to have a negative impact on the emotional
well-being of the victim. This is not the direction the law has taken, at
least not directly. Ordinarily, contract damages are not available for
148
mental suffering.
These would be consequential damages, and
therefore, subject to both foreseeability and certainty of amount
149
limitations. According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
“[r]ecovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach
also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind
150
that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”
Spitefulness looks to the intention of the breaching party in
breaching the contract. Instead, as the Restatement reflects, the issue is
less along the lines of the state of mind of the breaching party and more
along the lines of whether the type of breach could be expected to result
in significant mental suffering regardless of any specific ill-will of the
defendant. The exclusion of damages for mental suffering is not
151
absolute. For example, even in a commercial context, buyers of onion
seeds that turned out to be defective recovered damages for emotional
145

Id.
Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969). See also Compuspa, Inc.
v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 613, 627 (D. Md. 2002).
147
Clements, 437 S.W.2d at 822 (emphasis added). Even there, though, the court
observed that actual malice may not be required in cases of fraud. Id.
148
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 840 (3d ed. 1999); 3 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
149
24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:7 (4th ed.
2001). See, e.g., Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1200 (11th Cir.
2007).
150
RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, at § 353.
151
Sheely, 505 F.3d at 1200.
146
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distress when their farm was forced into bankruptcy.
Plus, the
restriction does not apply to cases that cross the borderline into tort
where damages for mental suffering are available. Nevertheless, it is rare
to find that the spitefulness of the defendant plays a role in awarding
damages for mental suffering.
153
One example of this rarity is Cabaness v. Thomas, a Utah Supreme
Court case. The plaintiff, a discharged employee, brought an action
154
based on “harassment, intimidation and abuse” in the workplace.
Defendants were granted summary judgment. On appeal, the court held
that recovery based on mental suffering was permitted based on a
contract theory. According to the court, such damages were recoverable
when they were both “a foreseeable result of the breach of contract and
explicitly within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
155
was entered into.” Somewhat similarly, a court has permitted damages
for mental suffering when the display of plaintiff’s photograph (in
156
violation of the contract) was deemed to be malicious. Very little, if
anything, should be inferred from these cases. Although the hurtful
intent of the actor might well exist in instances in which mental suffering
is the basis for recovery, it is not at all clear that there is a causal
connection.
C. Facilitation of Positional Goods
As a general matter, current law does little to discourage positional
externalities resulting from the consumption of positional goods. The
two areas of law that are most relevant are tax and trademark. Tax law
has the capacity to lower positional spending and does so, in a minor way,
by the application of a progressive income tax. Trademark, as currently
applied, encourages it by allowing trademarks to be used as symbols of
status and wealth.

152

Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1991).
Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 486 (Utah 2010). For a differing approach,
see Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 09-03073-GHK (CTx), 2009 WL 10671689, at *5
(C.D. Cal. 2009); Rodrigues v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:08-CV-1417(PCD),
2009 WL 3710688, at *4 (D. Conn. 2009); Stokes v. Charleston Cty Sch. Dist., No. C.A.
2:05-CV-02970-DCN, 2007 WL 858864, at *7 (D. S.C. 2007).
154
Cabaness, 232 P.3d at 492.
155
Id. at 508.
156
McCreery v. Miller’s Grocerteria Co., 64 P.2d 803, 805 (Colo. 1937). See also
Trimble v. City & Cty. of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 730 (Colo. 1985).
153
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1. Tax Policy
157
For generations proposals have existed to curb rivalrous spending.
It is tempting to think of a luxury tax as having the greatest potential for
158
lowering the level of position spending. By taxing the purchase of
yachts, expensive cars, and jewelry at higher rates, the level of
consumption is reduced. This is because demand for luxury goods is
159
viewed as relatively elastic. There are two problems, however, with a
luxury tax as a means of controlling positional spending. First, since the
demand for any one positional good is elastic, people interested in
positional goods may simply switch to ones on which the tax is not
160
imposed. Second, some goods are subject to a “Veblen effect,” which
means as their price goes up they actually become more attractive as
161
positional goods. At the extreme, higher prices, at least in theory, could
lead to increases in the quantity demanded. Consequently, a luxury tax is
probably not an effective response to positional spending.
The challenge, then, is to structure a tax system that more or less
penalizes all positional spending. This seems to call for a progressive tax
on consumption. The leading modern proponent of such system is
economist Robert Frank, who has published widely on the issues raised
162
by positional spending.
He follows, however, the example of
163
philosophers and economists ranging from Hume to Milton Friedman.
The system would work like this. Suppose your income was $300,000. You
might save $20,000 and the rest (the amount used for consumption)
above a certain amount and with possible deductions, would be subject to
a progressive tax. Thus, your consumption above $200,000 might be
taxed at 20%. Consumption above $300,000 might be taxed at 25% and

157

See FRANK, supra note 60, at 223–24. For a history of the consumption tax, see
Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical
Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S. D. L. REV. 8, 33–34 (2001).
158
The Unites States experimented with a luxury tax in the period 1990–1993. It
was a tax on automobiles, yachts, furs, jewelry, and aircraft that had a price above a
certain amount. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§ 4001–
4007, 104 Stat. 1388, 439–42 (repealed 2002).
159
Because demand curves slope downward, an increase in the price of an item
typically leads to a decrease in quality demanded. Elasticity refers to the percentage
change in price as compared to the percentage change in quantity demanded. If
demand is elastic, the percentage change in quantity demand is higher than the
percentage change in price. Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/p/priceelasticity.asp.
160
This is a reference to Thornstein Veblen, to whom the term “conspicuous
consumption” is attributed. See Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen
Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349 (1996).
161
See Mason, supra note 45, at 125.
162
See supra notes 11, 44, 45, & 47.
163
FRANK, supra note 60, at 223. See generally NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE
TAX 11 (1955); Cockfield, supra note 157.
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so on. Frank believes that the system would be successful in curbing
spending because it leaves everyone in the same relative position. He puts
it like this: “In a society with a progressive consumption tax, the
wealthiest drivers might buy a Porsche 911 Turbo for $150,000 rather
than a Ferrari Berlinetta F12 for more than twice that amount. But since
everyone would be scaling back, that society’s Porsche owners would be
just as excited about their cars as Ferrari owners are under the current
164
tax system.”
In theory, a consumption tax would likely have a huge impact on
spending that is ultimately intended to diminish others by virtue of
165
demonstrating or signaling superiority. There are, however, detractors.
For example, there are questions about whether the tax could ever be
166
passed with levels of progressivity that would make a difference.
Moreover, the notion that expenditures must be taxed because of the
167
negative effect they have on others is not one that appeals politically.
There is also an underlying empirical question of how serious relative
168
consumption is. Regardless of these reservations, as far as current U.S.
tax policy, it clearly falls short of the optimal policy to curtail positional
consumption.
2. Trademark
While tax policy can be viewed as neutral with respect to positional
consumption, trademark law is nothing less than a method of subsidizing
it. Normally we think of trademark law as a method of avoiding confusion
by providing information to buyers in the marketplace. A certain label or
mark carries with it information about the quality of the product. The
terms “Rolex” and “McDonalds” in their own ways tell a story. The
problem is that trademarks can carry two stories. One is about the
product and one is about the person possessing the product. When it
communicates about the buyer, the two most relevant types of
169
information have been called snob effects and Veblen effects. The snob
effect occurs when consumer demand is influenced by a desire to
164

ROBERT H. FRANK, SUCCESS AND LUCK: GOOD FORTUNE AND THE MYTH OF
MERITOCRACY 119 (2016).
165
A good summary of objections is found in Cockfield, supra note 157, at 66–68.
See also Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE
L.J. 1081, 1096–97 (1980); David R. Henderson, Robert Frank’s Strange Case for Taxing
‘The Rich,’ CATO (Nov./Dec. 2007), https://www.cato.org/policy-report/
novemberdecember-2007/robert-franks-strange-case-taxing-rich.
166
FRANK, supra note 60, at 225.
167
Id.
168
Henderson, supra note 165.
169
Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of
Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 189 (1950). Leibenstein also identifies
“bandwagon effects” in which consumer demand is influenced by a desire to go along
with the crowd.
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distinguish oneself. The idea is to signal a different set, and presumably
170
superior set of tastes. Veblen goods, on the other hand, are associated
with what is normally called conspicuous consumption, and the
171
attraction can be the price itself. The two concepts can merge at times;
very expensive items can be believed to be associated with snobbery and
standing out from the crowd in terms of one’s taste. Nevertheless, the key
ingredient in these cases is something that identifies the good in the eyes
of observers—often this means trademark is critical to signaling.
This type of signaling is quite different from the signaling that is
meant to convey information about product quality and to lower
transaction costs yet it seems to be part of modern mainstream trademark
172
law. For example, in Mastercrafters Clock and Radio Company v. Vacheron
173
& Constatin-Le Watches, Inc. the manufacturer of a relatively expensive
clock challenged the manufacturers of a significantly less expensive copy.
The appellate court reversed the lower court and endorsed status
signaling:
[P]laintiff copied the design of the Atmos clock because plaintiff
intended to, and did, attract purchasers who wanted a “luxury
design” clock. This goes to show at least that some customers would
buy plaintiff’s cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the
prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’
homes would regard as a prestigious article. Plaintiff’s wrong thus
consisted of the fact that such a visitor would be likely to assume
that the clock was an Atmos clock.174

170

Id.; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the
Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195, 207 (2007).
171
Leibenstein, supra note 169, at 189. For an empirical examination of
signaling, see Angela Chao & Juliet B. Schor, Empirical Tests of Status Consumption:
Evidence from Women’s Cosmetics, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 107, 109 (1998). See also Bagwell
& Bernheim, supra note 160, at 349 (examining situations where “Veblen effects”
arise from the desire to gain social status by conspicuous consumption to signal
wealth); Robert L. Basmann et al., A Note on Measuring Veblen’s Theory of Conspicuous
Consumption, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 531 (1988).
172
See generally Harrison, supra note 170, at 227; Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96
MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012). See also Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91
VA. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2005). Although status signaling was endorsed before this
time, it is noteworthy that the Lanham Act was amended in 1962. Prior to that time it
covered instances in which confusion might be caused to “purchasers as to the source
of original . . . goods or services.” The 1962 amendments dropped the word
“purchasers.” Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 87-772, sec. 11, § 16, 76 Stat. 769, 771 (1962)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006)).
173
Mastercrafters Clock and Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constatin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1955) (decided on the basis of unfair
competition).
174
Id. at 466.
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The same sentiment is found in a more recent case concerning
175
knock-offs of the so-called “Kelly Bag.” The lower court focused on
confusion by purchasers and noted that any confusion would be dealt
176
with at the point of sale. In effect, there was no harm to the public. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that that there was an
177
infringement by those making knock-offs. According to the court, “a
loss occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it
off to the public as the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing
public and achieving the status of owning the genuine article at a
178
knockoff price.”
Finally, Judge Kozinski has weighed in with his own defense of the
public investment in promoting Veblen effects. In the context of the
Rolex watch he argues: Allowing the copies to exist is “a pure loss”
because it “will make it less likely that Rolex . . . and others will invest in
image advertising, denying the image-conscious among us something we hold
179
near and dear.” Judge Kozinski does not explain why the fact that people
180
value status should result in a public investment to maintain vanity.
One can debate the proper role of trademark law but there is little
or no basis to believe this area of American law does anything other than
incentivize positional consumption and the underlying spiteful
underpinnings. One question this Article addresses is whether United
States law is sufficiently nuanced to permit spitefulness when it is, like in
181
the ultimatum game, a protest against injustice. At least in the context
of trademark law, this question is moot. It is not clear how justice seeking
in the context of conspicuous consumption would manifest itself.

175
Hermes Int’l v. Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc. 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Kelly Bag is made by Hermes. Its value skyrocketed when Princess Grace of
Monaco was spotted carrying one in the mid 1950s. Today Kelly Bag prices can
exceed $10,000. Hermes 32 cm Kelly Capucine Bag, BAGHUNTER, https://baghunter.
com/products/hermes-kelly-32-capucine-ghw. See generally, Harrison, supra note 170 at
201 n.27.
176
Hermes Int’l v. Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 226
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
177
Hermes Int’l., 219 F.3d at 110; see also Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l
Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d
145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987).
178
Hermes Int’l., 219 F.3d at 109.
179
Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 970 (1993)
(emphasis added).
180
For an argument that there is no economic or moral basis for an investment
in status signaling, see Harrison, supra note 170, at 227. For a different view, see
Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for “Irrational Beliefs”, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 605 (2007).
181
See supra text accompanying notes 21–38.
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D. Criminal Law
Does spite play a role in criminal punishment? This is a difficult
question, in part, because there are two perspectives to adopt. One can
ask whether the general deterrence function of criminal law deters some
actions that are spite-based. Almost certainly it does. There are many
crimes in which the satisfaction of the perpetrator is directly related to
the disutility of the victim. Hate crimes fit this description, as do rape and
182
various instances of cruelty to people and animals. The fact that assaults
and batteries are more harshly punished if they are “aggravated” lends
183
some support to this as well.
In particular when it comes to harms to people, as opposed to
property, it makes sense to have enhanced penalties. This is a broad
statement to make, and it is impossible to say whether crimes to persons
are more severely punished than crimes to property, because there is no
standard for comparison. Still, spite-motivated crimes are quite different
184
from property crimes. As noted earlier,
at least one theory for
punishing theft and perhaps other crimes involving property is that we
would like to channel those activities into the market. One could think of
185
punishment as the price one pays for bypassing the market. If the price
is high enough, a market transaction becomes more attractive. In the
case of spite, there can be no market transaction—there is no gain to the
186
spiteful person if there is consent. The theory and several examples
suggest that criminal law does attempt to some degree to deter spiteful
conduct.
The other perspective is whether criminal law exists as a reflection
of our own spite. As a starting point, consider the generally accepted
rationales for punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation,
187
retribution.
It seems doubtful that those who determine the
182

For express considerations of spite see, e.g., U.S. v. Diamond, 65 M.J. 876, 892
(A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007); B.A.L. v. Apple, No. 00-0068-C-B/G, 2001 WL 1135024, at
*7 n.4 (S.D. Ind. 2001); People v. Gomez-Perez, No. C056219, 2009 WL 795289, at
*12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Klokoc v. Florida, 589 So.2d 219, 219 (Fla. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Tanzer, No. 096-P-902, 2010 WL 1539860 at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
2010); North Carolina v. Forest, 362 S.E.2d 252, 255 (N.C. 1987); Tennessee v.
Carlton, No. W2009-01004-CCA-RD-CD, 2010 WL 571798, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2010).
183
See, e.g., Young v. Florida, 753 So. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Moakley v. Florida, 547 So .2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Lutz, 113
N.E.2d 757, 758 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
184
See supra text accompanying notes 61–66.
185
This price is in terms of expected punishment, which is the probability of
apprehension and conviction times the actual penalty.
186
For a discussion, see Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 246 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2000) (Calabresi concurring).
187
Christopher Adams Thorn, Retribution Exclusive of Deterrence: An Insufficient
Justification for Capital Punishment, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 200 (1983).
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appropriate level of punishment for deterrence are motivated by spite.
Nor does it seem that spite can explain incapacitation or rehabilitation. It
is not that these are not costly to society nor that they are not aimed to
achieve specific goals. The problem is that they are designed to
accomplish goals that accrue to the benefit of society. It is true that
someone may feel gratified to know someone else is suffering, but none
of these future-looking goals seem to have spite as an underlying rational.
As defined here, it is retribution that appears to be akin to spite; all
we get out of it is the satisfaction that others will suffer. This would be,
however, a utilitarian perspective, and for the most part, retribution is
not viewed as having a utilitarian basis. In this vein, John Cottingham
189
writes about “Varieties of Retribution” of which he says there are no less
than nine. One he labels “satisfaction theory,” which he defines as: “A
man is rightly punished because his punishment bring satisfaction to
190
others.” In effect, “there should be some kind of reciprocity between
the sense of grievance felt by the victim . . . and the satisfaction he gets
191
from the suffering of the offender.” Cottingham rejects this view of
retribution first, because it involves interpersonal comparisons of utility,
and second, because it is fundamentally utilitarian in that it is “a
mechanism for the prevention of vendettas” which makes society better
192
off.
Rawls also captures this non-instrumental view of retribution: “What
we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the
grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a
person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing
. . . . The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally
193
better than the state of affairs where he does not . . . .” He goes on to
contrast this with the utilitarian view whereby punishment is dependent
194
on the net beneficial consequences for society.
Finally, the idea is beautifully expressed by Kant:
Even if a civil society were dissolved through the unanimous vote of
its members (e.g., if an island society decided to dissolve with its
members spreading themselves over the rest of the earth), the last
murderer within its prison first must be executed so that he
experiences what his own deeds are worth and the bloodguilt does
188

For a possibly dissenting view, see James Fitzjames Stephen, History of
Criminal Law in England 81 (1883) cited in, Stanley C. Brubaker, Can Liberals
Punish?, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 821, 824 (1988).
189
John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979).
190
Id. at 241.
191
Id. at 242.
192
Id. See also Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 71, 71–72 (1980).
193
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955).
194
Id. at 5.
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not cling to the society that did not insist on this punishment: since,
if so, it can be seen as having participated in that public violation of
justice.195

The point is that there are utilitarian reasons—rehabilitation,
incapacitation, deterrence—for punishment which seem to have little or
nothing to do with spitefulness of those imposing the punishment. On
the other hand, while we may feel better about a system in which
wrongdoers are punished without regard for the any identifiable social
benefit, this purpose of punishment similarly cannot easily be tied to
spite as it is defined here. Indeed, underlying much of criminal law and
procedure seems to be a desire to filter out the spiteful inclinations of
victims. As an example, consider the burglaries of two homes while the
occupants are away. In one case, the victims are distraught and their hate
for the thief so powerful they would like personal revenge and would feel
no remorse afterward. Their feelings of spite are so overwhelming they
would be willing to violate the law and suffer the consequences as long as
the thief is made to suffer. The occupants of the other house are upset
but take it in stride. They hate that it happened but feel no hatred toward
the thief. Everything else being equal, the two thieves will be treated alike
regardless of spiteful feelings.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Spite is not a simple concept. Some actions are motivated by a desire
to harm others as a source of the actor’s satisfaction. Those same actions
may be a reaction to a personal sense of injustice. Finally, spite-like
actions are consistent with simply righting a wrong. This Article makes
the case that spite, in its worst from, is comparable to theft. It is a taking
of someone’s sense of wellbeing without consent. This Article also claims
that the purchase of positional goods is ultimately spite driven. It
canvasses tort law, contracts, tax law, trademark, and criminal law in an
effort to assess the reaction of the law to spite.
Because spite is a form of theft, it is not surprising to find that the
strongest reactions are in tort law, and to some extent, criminal law. Both
are applied in a way to deter spiteful actions. In tort law this means a
greater likelihood of punitive damages. In criminal law it may be
enhanced punishment. Contract law has yet to develop any coherent
reaction to spite and such a development seems unlikely. Interestingly,
tax policy falls well short of its potential in terms of curbing spite and
trademark law actually subsidizes it. Although there is evidence in
sociology and psychology that some spite is relatively benign or even
socially beneficial, there is little indication that the law has any

195

B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution
in its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151, 151 (1989).
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predictable way to distinguish these instances from ordinary selfregarding spite.

